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In the case of modern enterprise system separating the right of ownership and 
operation, owner and operator are seeking to maximize their own interests, and 
operators do not always aim at maximizing the interests of owners. So designing 
compensation incentives based on accounting earnings and performance of the 
company, drive operators work hard to reduce the conflict of interest between owners 
and operators. However, changing the measurement methods in salary would 
obviously convert the owner and operator interests’ distribution, which might have 
executives choose the accounting measurement rules and manage specific transactions 
to improve their compensation. In order to consist the pursuits of maximizing 
self-interest and company value, the listed companies promote executive ownership 
incentives to reduce senior manager’ opportunistic behaviors. But operators will 
naturally be more concerned about the company’s share price when the stock and 
options have become another source of managerial compensation. Further more, as 
the securities analysts and investors’ expectation on the company’s stock price is 
severely affected by profit figures in financial statements, there is still motivation to 
manage earnings for executives. 
In the study of domestic earnings management motive, most of them make the 
capital market as the central, thus derived from the research to related motivation. A 
few of them from the perspective of compensation contract to study, and about the 
management of equity-based incentives and earnings management literature is even 
less. Based on this, this article studies the implementation of the executive ownership 
incentives companies’ earnings management, and study executives of the listed firms 
have the motivation to manage earnings for improving their rewards. We wish the 
articles has some practical significance to development of executive ownership 
mechanisms and enhancement the quality of disclosure of relevant information. 














basis of combing on theories of earnings management and summing up the research 
findings of executive ownership incentives and earnings management, which is the 
paper’ theoretical foundation. Based on these studies, this thesis uses two linear 
regression models respectively to do an empirical research on the relationship 
between managerial ownership of listed companies and earnings management at last 
by estimating the level of earnings management with item below the line and selecting 
the years from 2006 to 2008. First, 3479 samples are selected for this study, to 
research whether executive own shareholding have an outstanding effect on earnings 
management or not. After having positive results, selecting 1753 samples on the 
condition that the executive holding share number are greater than zero, the second 
section empirically analysis the impact of the executive ownership to the earnings 
management. The result showing that executive of listed companies in the 
implementation of ownership incentive system, exist in pursuit of high rewards for the 
motivated earnings management behavior and the degree of earnings management is 
related to the degree of equity-based incentive positively and outstandingly. Finally, 
this paper brings up relevant policy-related suggestions, combined with the empirical 
fruits and the practical circumstances. 
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图 1.1 是本文的研究思路和分析框架。 
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图 1.1 本文框架结构图 
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